Mercer Law Review
Volume 62
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 11

12-2010

Legal Ethics
Patrick Emery Longan
Mercer University School of Law, LONGAN_P@law.mercer.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 215 (2010).

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan
During the survey period from June 1, 2009 through May 31, 2010,
the appellate courts in Georgia decided cases involving the discipline of
lawyers, ineffective assistance of counsel, legal malpractice, bar
admission, judicial ethics, and attorney disqualification.' The courts
also decided one case involving an important issue of professionalism
and several miscellaneous cases. The State Bar of Georgia Formal
Advisory Opinion Board issued several opinions that relate to the
professional responsibilities of Georgia lawyers.
I.

LAWYER DISCIPLINE2

Disbarments
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred lawyers during the survey
period for theft and other issues involving the handling of money, client

A.

* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (A.B., 1979);
University of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. For analysis of Georgia legal ethics law during the prior survey period, see Patrick
Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 231
(2009).
2. In addition to dispensing discipline, the Georgia Supreme Court also has the power
to order reinstatements for suspended lawyers and to grant certifications of fitness for
readmission to lawyers who were previously disbarred. BAR OF GA. HANDBOOK R. 8-108
(2009), available at http*//gabar.org/public/pdfhandbook-web.pdf. During the survey
period, the court reinstated five lawyers who had been suspended. In re Hudson, 286 Ga.
727, 728, 690 S.E.2d 853, 854 (2010); In re Lewis, 287 Ga. 130, 131, 694 S.E.2d 664, 664
(2010); In re Lenn, 286 Ga. 257, 258, 686 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2009); In re Caroway, 285 Ga.
811, 812, 683 S.E.2d 598, 598 (2009); In re Waldrop, 285 Ga. 529, 530, 678 S.E.2d 90, 91
(2009). The court also granted certifications for fitness to three lawyers who previously
had been disbarred or who had voluntarily surrendered their licenses following felony
convictions. In re Calhoun, 286 Ga. 471, 471-72, 689 S.E.2d 311, 311-12 (2010); In re
Friedberg, 286 Ga. 472, 472-73, 689 S.E.2d 312, 312-13 (2010); In re Siegelman, 285 Ga.
817, 817-18, 683 S.E.2d 595, 595-96 (2009).
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neglect or abandonment, and criminal convictions.? The court also
disbarred one lawyer by a vote of 4-3 in an unusual case in which there
were many disputed issues of fact.
1. Money Issues. The supreme court disbarred nine lawyers during
the survey period for transgressions that involved client or law firm
money. Three lawyers were disbarred for what appear to be straightforward acts of thievery. Sabrina K. Bozeman settled a client's personal
injury claim, forged her client's name to the settlement check, and
converted the funds to her own use. When the State Bar of Georgia's
Office of General Counsel contacted Bozeman about her conduct, she
falsely stated that she had delivered the settlement proceeds to her
client.' Another lawyer, Howard Geoffrey Slade, voluntarily surrendered his license after he received $80,000 on behalf of a client but never
deposited the funds into his trust account, gave them to the client, or
otherwise accounted for them. Slade received $238,000 from another
client but did not deposit the money in his trust account and never
returned or accounted for the funds.6 A third lawyer, Steven E. Zagoria,
did not take money from clients. Instead, he forged a partner's
signature on checks from clients to his firm for attorney fees and thereby
converted over $343,000 of his firm's money to his own use."
Three lawyers were disbarred for violations related to money that
occurred in other states. The supreme court disciplined two of these
lawyers as matters of reciprocal discipline.' One had been disbarred in
North Carolina for misappropriating $23,780 from a trust account.?
Another had suffered the same fate in the District of Columbia after she
was appointed by a court as guardian for a ward of the state but then
misappropriated $10,000 from the ward's estate for her personal use.'
A third lawyer represented a client in a Texas probate proceeding and
allowed his personal financial interests to impair his representation.
The lawyer owned several promissory notes and convinced his client to

3. Lawyers in Georgia can voluntarily surrender their licenses or submit a petition for
voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 4-227 (2001). The acceptance of
a voluntary surrender of a license or the granting of a petition for voluntary discipline of
disbarment are tantamount to disbarment by the court and are treated as such in this
Article.
4. In re Bozeman, 286 Ga. 510, 510, 689 S.E.2d 318, 319 (2010).
5. In re Slade, 286 Ga. 465, 465, 689 S.E.2d 315, 316 (2010).
6. In re Zagoria, 286 Ga. 415, 415-16, 687 S.E.2d 832, 832 (2010).
7. In re Boniface, 285 Ga. 815,816-17,684 S.E.2d 268,268-69 (2009); In re Wilson, 285
Ga. 875, 875, 684 S.E.2d 630, 630 (2009).
8. In re Boniface, 285 Ga. at 815-16, 684 S.E.2d at 268.
9. In re Wilson, 285 Ga. at 875, 684 S.E.2d at 630.
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purchase the notes. The notes turned out to be worthless. The lawyer
also borrowed money from his client." The supreme court accepted his
voluntary surrender of his license.n
Three other lawyers lost their licenses because of their conduct in
connection with numerous real estate matters. In one case, the supreme
court held that Wade Gunnar Anderson failed to supervise his nonlawyer staff adequately." Employees double-wired funds at ten closings,
with the result that Anderson's trust account became overdrawn by
approximately $2.3 million." In a separate matter, about which the
supreme court expressed particular concern, Anderson was the escrow
agent for funds related to a dispute about the repair of a condominium."' Mr. Anderson worked to resolve the claim and then paid himself
$30,000 out of the escrowed funds without authorization." The court
disbarred Mr. Anderson and specified conditions for his reinstatement.'
In another real estate case, the supreme court disbarred
Leonanous A. Moore for a number of infractions, including failures to
return money held in escrow, failure to record deeds in several transactions that he closed, and overdrawing two trust accounts." Finally, the
court accepted the voluntary surrender of the license of a lawyer who
closed numerous real estate loans in which he prepared false documentation showing that the lender had a first lien." The lawyer also
prepared false title opinions and title insurance policies for these
loans.xe
2. Neglect or Abandonment. The supreme court disbarred six
lawyers for, at least in part, abandonment or neglect of clients. Three
of these lawyers present classic cases. Sami Omar Malas accepted over
$10,000 to fie two patent applications for a client and to perform other
tasks. Malas apparently did not do the work, ceased communicating
with the client, never returned any of the fees, and abandoned his
practice. 2 0 Thomas Burke was serving as the attorney for an estate but

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

In re Bain, 286 Ga. 35, 35-36, 685 S.E.2d 80, 81 (2009).
Id. at 36, 685 S.E.2d at 81.
In re Anderson, 286 Ga. 137, 139-40, 685 S.E.2d 711, 712-13 (2009).
Id at 138, 685 S.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 139-40, 685 S.E.2d at 712-13.
Id. at 140, 685 S.E.2d at 713.
Id. at 141, 685 S.E.2d at 713.
In re Moore, 285 Ga. 731, 732-33, 684 S.E.2d 71, 72 (2009).
In re Wright, 286 Ga. 468, 468-69, 689 S.E.2d 822, 822 (2010).
Id. at 468, 689 S.E.2d at 822.
In re Malas, 286 Ga. 34, 35, 685 S.E.2d 81, 81-82 (2009).
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neglected to disburse the assets or wind up the estate." Burke was
disbarred for his conduct in New York and disbarred in Georgia as a
matter of reciprocal discipline.' Jeffrey Brooks Kent filed a suit for a
client but failed to serve one defendant, did not meet a court deadline for
filing a proposed scheduling and discovery order, and "stipulated to the
dismissal of the case without his client's consent."'
Kent did not
communicate with his client during the case, and after the client fired
him, Kent did not refund the fee or send the file to the client's new
lawyer.24
Three of the cases involving abandonment included other violations as
well. Coleman C. Eaton Jr. represented a client in an automobile
accident case but failed to act with diligence, explain the case to the
client, or comply with the client's information requests. Eaton then
falsely claimed to the State Bar of Georgia's Office of General Counsel
that he met with the client and resolved their differences. In another
case involving a different client, Eaton falsified discovery responses and
a financial affidavit, and after he was fired, he failed to turn over the
unearned fees or the complete file. 25 Eaton was disbarred.26
The supreme court also disbarred Wendell S. Henry as a result of four
grievances.' In two of the underlying matters, Henry failed to return
client files after being fired.' In another, Henry served for a time as
a "member agent" of a title insurance company but failed to account to
the company or permit an audit of his escrow account and was fired.29
Henry also practiced law while he was on suspension."o
Finally, the supreme court disbarred James M. Kimbrough III for
abandoning clients.
With respect to one client, he failed to file a
petition for adoption, initially responded untruthfully to the client's
inquiries, and then stopped responding to the client at all. With respect
to another client, Kimbrough undertook to incorporate a business on
behalf of the client, but he never filed the necessary papers. The client
was unable to contact Kimbrough because Kimbrough moved his office
and disconnected his phone. With respect to yet a third client,

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

In re Burke, 286 Ga. 729, 730, 690 S.E.2d 854, 854 (2010).
Id. at 729-30, 690 S.E.2d at 854-55.
In re Kent, 287 Ga. 129, 129, 694 S.E.2d 665, 665 (2010).
Id. at 129, 694 S.E.2d at 665.
In re Eaton, 286 Ga. 28, 29, 685 S.E.2d 279, 280 (2009).
Id. at 30, 685 S.E.2d at 280.
In re Henry, 285 Ga. 871, 873, 684 S.E.2d 624, 626 (2009).
Id. at 872, 684 S.E.2d at 625.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 873, 684 S.E.2d at 626.
In re Kimbrough, 286 Ga. 30, 31-32, 685 S.E.2d 713, 715-16 (2009).
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Kimbrough failed to honor an agreement that required him to reimburse
a client if he was paid by an opposing party in a child support case. He
eventually stopped responding to this client as well.3 2
Criminal Convictions. Six Georgia lawyers voluntarily
3.
surrendered their licenses as a result of criminal convictions. Frederick
Andrew Gardner misled an agent of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation
who was investigating alleged mortgage fraud. Gardner pled guilty to
misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer.' In accepting the surrender of his license, the supreme court noted "that mortgage fraud is ...
a very serious problem in Georgia and that real estate closing attorneys
are relied on by their lender clients and by the public to act ethically
and lawfully to identify and prevent such fraud, rather than facilitating
Deborah K. Rice,
and concealing it as Gardner admits doing."'
Christopher M. Kunkel, and Robert P. Copeland all surrendered their
licenses after they pled guilty to federal fraud charges.' Jeffrey Scott
Denny pled guilty to one felony count of forgery and three felony counts
of fraud-financial identity.' One of the special conditions of Denny's
probation was the surrender of his law license, and the supreme court
accepted his voluntary surrender." Charles A. Thomas Jr. surrendered
his license after he was convicted of fifty-five counts of forgery and theft
by taking in superior court."
4. One Unusual Case. The supreme court, by a vote of 4-3,
disbarred Marcus Stan Ballew."' The Special Master, recommended
disbarment, but the Review Panel took issue with the Special Master's
findings of fact and recommended a one-year suspension instead.40 The
court, however, accepted the Special Master's findings of fact.4
Ballew's problems arose primarily from his representation of a client and
her children in connection with an automobile collision. Ballew settled
all the claims without client approval and did not provide an accounting
of the funds. He signed the client's name to the check for the settlement

32. Id. at 30-31, 685 S.E.2d at 715-16.
33. In re Gardner, 286 Ga. 623, 623-24, 690 S.E.2d 611, 612 (2010).
34. Id. at 624, 690 S.E.2d at 613.
35. In re Rice, 286 Ga. 622, 622, 690 S.E.2d 613, 613 (2010); In re Kunkel, 285 Ga. 877,
877,684 S.E.2d 628,628 (2009); In re Copeland, 285 Ga. 528,528,678 S.E.2d 90,90 (2009).
36. In re Denny, 286 Ga. 895, 895, 692 S.E.2d 386, 386 (2010).
37. Id. at 895-96, 692 S.E.2d at 386.
38. In re Thomas, 286 Ga. 177, 177, 686 S.E.2d 130, 130 (2009).
39. In re Ballew, 287 Ga. 371, 376, 695 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2010).
40. Id. at 371-72, 695 S.E.2d at 573.
41. Id. at 376, 695 S.E.2d at 576.
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of the children's claims. He also signed his client's name to settlement
documents and had his employees falsely notarize some of them. Unlike
most attorneys who engage in such conduct, however, Ballew did not just
abscond with the money; he paid the client sums over several years.
However, the amounts did not bear any particular relation to the
amounts of the settlements and exceeded the amounts to which the
client was entitled. Ballew also filed a claim for the client for social
security benefits but left her uninformed about the status of the
matter." On this version of the facts, the supreme court disbarred
Ballew.a Three justices dissented in a three-sentence opinion."

B. Suspensions
The supreme court suspended five lawyers during the survey period.
Gregory C. Menefee received an indefinite suspension as a matter of
reciprocal discipline after the Kentucky Supreme Court suspended him
on an interim basis following allegations that he had dealt improperly
with client funds.' Patrick J. Smith's suspension also resulted from
reciprocal discipline, which stemmed from the Maryland Court of
Appeals decision to suspend him for committing the criminal act of
falsely representing himself as a police officer to a witness in a criminal
case." Michael B. Wallace caused his client and himself to miss a
court hearing and initially lied to his former client's new counsel about
why they missed the hearing."' In light of two prior incidents of
discipline, the supreme court suspended Wallace for sixty days.4 '
Finally, George E. Powell Jr. received a three-year suspension for
deceitful conduct in connection with the preparation of false HUD-1
statements for six related real estate transactions.
In one somewhat surprising case, the supreme court suspended a
lawyer who failed to pursue legal matters entrusted to him by five
clients.' The lawyer also failed to communicate with these clients."
This conduct usually warrants disbarment, especially in light of the
lawyer's prior history of discipline. 2 Chief Justice Hunstein dissented

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 372-73, 695 S.E.2d at 573-74.
Id. at 376, 695 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
In re Menefee, 286 Ga. 32, 32-34, 685 S.E.2d 276, 276-77 (2009).
In re Smith, 286 Ga. 463, 463-64, 689 S.E.2d 315, 315 (2010).
In re Wallace, 287 Ga. 157, 157, 695 S.E.2d 23, 24 (2010).
Id.
In re Powell, 285 Ga. 812, 812-13, 683 S.E.2d 613, 614 (2009).
In re Bagwell, 286 Ga. 511, 511, 689 S.E.2d 316, 317 (2010).
Id.
See supra Part IA.
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because she believed the lawyer should have been disbarred.53 In
reaching its decision, the court noted that the lawyer had been diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression,
and anxiety, and that he had experienced marital difficulties during the
relevant time period." The court imposed a two-year suspension and
made reinstatement conditional upon the lawyer's addressing his
psychiatric issues.'

C. Reprimands
The supreme court approved seven voluntary petitions for Review
Panel reprimands from the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board
of the State of Georgia (Review Panel) and ordered one public reprimand
during the survey period. Craig Steven Mathis received a Review Panel
reprimand for his misconduct in connection with a child custody case.'
He did not meet with the client in person, delayed filing the petition for
several months, and had the client sign a verification of the petition
before the petition was even prepared." Ralph James Villani received
his Review Panel reprimand because he failed to communicate with a
client and charged her an unreasonable fee.' The same punishment
befell Sylvia Ann Martin after she helped her husband obtain a cash
advance from his business when he was in a dispute with a business
partner. 9 The cash advance came from her husband's American
Express business card. Martin used his wife's merchant account, which
had been established to enable her to collect legal fees. The cash
advance went into her operating account and then presumably to the
husband, even though no legal services had been rendered. That
deceitful conduct was the basis of the discipline.'
Kindall Grant neglected to supervise a paralegal who swindled her
clients out of $2000 at a real estate closing, and as a result, Grant
received a reprimand from the Review Panel.e' Grant also improperly
monitored her trust account and failed to inform a title insurance
company when her agency was terminated." Kevin Schumaker failed
to communicate and act with promptness for two clients when he was
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

In re Bagwell, 286 Ga. at 612, 689 S.E.2d at 318 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 511, 689 S.E.2d at 317 (majority opinion).
Id. at 511-12, 689 S.E.2d at 318.
In re Mathis, 286 Ga. 728, 728-29, 691 S.E.2d 202, 202 (2010).
Id. at 728, 691 S.E.2d at 202.
In re Villani, 286 Ga. 621, 621-22, 690 S.E.2d 614, 614 (2010).
In re Martin, 286 Ga. 417, 417-18, 687 S.E.2d 830, 831 (2010).
Id.
In re Grant, 287 Ga. 131, 131-33, 694 S.E.2d 647, 648-49 (2010).
Id. at 132, 694 S.E.2d at 648.
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serving as a public defender.' After he sought treatment for depression and alcoholism, Schumaker sought and received a Review Panel
reprimand for his misconduct.' The supreme court approved the same
punishment for Stanley J. Kakol Jr.' Kakol was a bankruptcy lawyer
who accepted a $1000 retainer from a client but did not place the money
in an escrow account, although he allegedly told the bankruptcy trustee
that he had done so." The court added conditions to his reprimand
that limited the type of work he could do and required him to continue
treatment with a licensed psychologist or a board-certified psychiatrist.67 Gary Gilbert Guichard received a Review Panel reprimand
because in his representation of three indigent criminal defendants, he
failed to adequately explain matters to his clients, comply with their
reasonable requests for information, or keep them reasonably informed.' Finally, Richard Allen Hunt received a public reprimand for
failing to respond to a client's requests for information.' The court
imposed the public reprimand because Hunt had a history of prior
discipline.o

D. ReciprocalDiscipline and Federal Court Discipline
The supreme court decided one significant case with respect to
reciprocal discipline during the survey period. 7 ' The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held M. Francis
Stubbs in contempt of court for representing clients in the district court
at a time when he was suspended from practice in the Southern District.
The district court fined Stubbs and placed conditions on when and how

63. In re Schumaker, 287 Ga. 128, 128, 695 S.E.2d 1, 1 (2010).
64. Id. at 128-29, 695 S.E.2d at 1.
65. In re Kakol, 286 Ga. 469, 470, 689 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2010).
66. Id. at 469, 689 S.E.2d at 309.
67. Id. at 470-71, 689 S.E.2d at 310.
68. In re Guichard, 286 Ga. 466, 466, 689 S.E.2d 823, 823 (2010).
69. In re R.A.H., 285 Ga. 870, 870-71, 684 S.E.2d 631, 632 (2009).
70. Id. at 871, 684 S.E.2d at 632.
71. See In re Stubbs, 285 Ga. 702, 681 S.E.2d 113 (2009). In addition to Stubbs, the
supreme court dealt with three other cases in which it rejected petitions for reciprocal
discipline. The court rejected one because the Georgia attorney had already been disbarred
in Georgia for misconduct. In re Campbell, 285 Ga. 874, 874, 684 S.E.2d 630, 631 (2009).
In another, the court rejected reciprocal discipline for a Florida lawyer because it approved
the Review Panel's finding that there was insufficient proof the lawyer had committed the
misconduct for which he consented to discipline, without making an admission of
misconduct, in Florida. In re R.E.J., 285 Ga. 813,813-14,683 S.E.2d 597,597 (2009). The
third case followed the holding of Stubbs described in the text. In re Cruse, 285 Ga. 673,
673, 681 S.E.2d 156, 156 (2009) (citing Stubbs, 285 Ga. at 703, 681 S.E.2d at 114).
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Stubbs could be readmitted to practice in the Southern District.72
Reciprocal discipline flows from Rule 9.4 of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct,7 3 which sets forth the streamlined procedures to
be followed to discipline a Georgia lawyer when "another jurisdiction"
has imposed discipline on the lawyer." The question presented in
Stubbs was whether the federal district court is "another jurisdiction" for
purposes of this rule." The supreme court held that it is not and that
"another jurisdiction" means other licensing jurisdictions rather than
Thus, the supreme court rejected reciprocal
individual courts."
discipline for Stubbs without prejudice to allow the State Bar to seek
disciplinary action under normal procedures for the underlying
misconduct." The opinion overruled a 2004 case in which the court
had imposed reciprocal discipline after a federal court had imposed
discipline." The opinion provoked a dissent from three justices who
argued that the court should be able to impose discipline on a reciprocal,
streamlined basis as long as the court that adjudicated the misconduct
did so "under procedures that meet the requirements of due process" and
as long as the action taken "is the functional equivalent of our state's
disciplinary proceedings."
E. Rejections of Petitions for Voluntary Discipline
In four cases, the supreme court rejected petitions for voluntary
discipline despite support for them from the State Bar. In one case, an
attorney wrongfully retained prepaid fees that he could not earn because
he had been suspended from practice." The court rejected the voluntary petition for a public reprimand." In another case, an attorney
agreed to represent a client in three matters and accepted payment from
the client. The lawyer then dissolved his practice, and the client was
unable to reach him. The lawyer entered into a consent judgment for

72.
73.
74.
R. 9.4.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Stubbs, 285 Ga. at 702, 681 S.E.2d at 113.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 9.4 (2009).
Stubbs, 285 Ga. at 702-03,681 S.E.2d at 113-14; see GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Stubbs, 285 Ga. at 703, 681 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 703-04, 681 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 704, 681 S.E.2d at 115.
Id.; see In re Griggs, 277 Ga. 663, 663, 593 S.E.2d 328, 328 (2004).
Stubbs, 285 Ga. at 705, 681 S.E.2d at 115 (Hines, J., dissenting).
In re Toler, 286 Ga. 412, 412-13, 687 S.E.2d 833, 833 (2010).
Id. at 413, 687 S.E.2d at 833.
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the unearned fees but did not satisfy that judgment.? The court
rejected his petition for a pubic reprimand.'
Attorney Michael J.C. Shaw sought a suspension after he defrauded
his law firm of approximately $527,000." The court rejected his
petition," and Justice Nahmias filed a concurrence in which he stated
that "Shaw is fortunate not to be incarcerated in a state or federal
prison for the half-million-dollar fraud he perpetrated against his
employer.
In another case, Justice Nahmias was again outraged at the State
Bar's support of a voluntary petition from an attorney who submitted
false evidence in a personal injury case in which she represented herself
pro se." The petition sought a Review Panel reprimand, and the State
Bar supported the petition." However, the court rejected the petition,' and in a long, scathing concurrence, Justice Nahmias stated the
followingThe attorney disciplinary process must protect the public from attorney
misconduct and promote public confidence in the legal profession.
Those purposes are not advanced by the proposal, recommended by the
State Bar in this case, that nothing more than a quiet reprimand is the
appropriate discipline for a lawyer who, based on her admissions and
the current record, knowingly submitted two fabricated documents to
her opposing party in discovery and again as evidence in a jury trial,
in an effort to obtain a damages award for herself.'
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals decided
numerous cases during the survey period regarding ineffective assistance
of counsel. Most of those cases were routine rejections of the claim.9 '

82. In re Pope, 286 Ga. 715, 716, 690 S.E.2d 851, 852 (2010).
83. Id.
84. In re Shaw, 286 Ga. 725, 725-26, 691 S.E.2d 544, 544 (2010).
85. Id. at 727, 691 S.E.2d at 545.
86. Id. (Nahmias, J., concurring).
87. In re Manning-Wallace, 287 Ga. 223,224, 695 S.E.2d 237,238 (2010) (Nahmias, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 223, 695 S.E.2d at 237 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 223-24, 695 S.E.2d at 238.
90. Id. at 232, 695 S.E.2d at 244 (Nahmias, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
91. One of those rejections warrants a brief mention. In Taylor v. State, 298 Ga. App.
145, 679 S.E.2d 371(2009), the defendant was convicted of burglary and claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel because his lawyer "was hostile, disrespectful, and demeaning toward
him." Id. at 145, 148, 679 S.E.2d at 372, 374. The court of appeals rejected the claim
because "a meaningful relationship between [the] defendant and his counsel is not a
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A number of the cases, however, are noteworthy not only because in
some the supreme court upheld claims of ineffective assistance, but also
because some involved reversals of lower court findings of ineffective
assistance, and some provoked dissenting opinions from one or more of
the justices.

A

GeorgiaSupreme Court

The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed four death penalty
cases in which habeas courts had found ineffective assistance of
counsel." The supreme court unanimously took the same action in one
drug possession case.' In another case, Williams v. Hall,' the court
reversed a habeas court's finding of ineffectiveness,' but the majority
opinion provoked a dissent from Justice Benham that was joined by
Chief Justice Hunstein." Trial counsel admitted at the habeas hearing
that he had done nothing to gather information independently of what
the prosecutor gave or told him.' The habeas court and the dissenting
justices concluded that such conduct constructively denied the defendant
counsel.98 The majority, however, reversed and remanded the case
because the defendant's pro se petition for habeas corpus did not include
the lack of investigation as a basis for relief."
In three cases, the supreme court affirmed convictions on direct appeal
over dissents of one or more justices with respect to claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In Reid v. State,'9 " the trial judge closed the
[constitutional] guarantee." Id. at 148,679 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Hammonds v. State, 218
Ga. App. 423, 424, 461 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court of appeals noted, however, that there was testimony that the lawyer called Mr.
Taylor "stupid" and that in a note passed to the client during trial, his lawyer called him
a "mother fucker." Id. Although Mr. Taylor could not demonstrate harm from counsel's
attitude, such treatment of a client is a far cry from what is expected of Georgia lawyers.
See STATE BAR OF GA. HANDBOOK, A LAWYER'S CREED H-147 (2009), availableat http//
www.gabar.org/related organizations/chief-justicescommissionon-professionalism/
lawyers-creed/ ("To my clients, I offer faithfulness, competence, diligence, and good
judgment. I will strive to represent you as I would want to be represented and to be
worthy of your trust.").
92. Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 783-84, 692 S.E.2d 580, 594-95 (2010); Hall v. Lance,
286 Ga. 365, 376, 687 S.E.2d 809, 818 (2010); Hall v. Lee, 286 Ga. 79, 79, 684 S.E.2d 868,
871 (2009); Hall v. Terrell, 285 Ga. 448, 457, 679 S.E.2d 17, 25 (2009).
93. Frazier v. Mathis, 286 Ga. 647, 648-49, 690 S.E.2d 840, 841-42 (2010).
94. 286 Ga. 280, 687 S.E.2d 414 (2009).
95. Id at 280-82, 687 S.E.2d at 415.
96. Id at 282, 687 S.E.2d at 415-16 (Benham, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 281, 687 S.E.2d at 415 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 283, 687 S.E.2d at 416 (Benham, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 281-82, 687 S.E.2d at 415 (majority opinion).
100. 286 Ga. 484, 690 S.E.2d 177 (2010).
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courtroom during the testimony of two witnesses after the prosecutor
The court noted that the closure
raised concerns for their safety.'
was error and conceded that if the defense counsel had objected, the
error would have required automatic reversal."' Here, however, the
trial counsel did not object, and that was one of the bases for the claim
of ineffectiveness." The court concluded that an ineffectiveness claim
based upon a failure to object to the closure of a courtroom does require
a showing of harm.'" Chief Justice Hunstein dissented, arguing
unsuccessfully that prejudice should be presumed and that the
conviction should have been set aside."0
The issue in Patterson v. State" was also whether prejudice could
be presumed." During the trial, the prosecutor made the following
statements in his closing argument:
And [defense counsel] says, you know, he makes that as if he's some
great innocent man because he wants a lawyer. Well if he hadn't done
anything, what did he want a lawyer for? I mean, a lawyer, I submit
to you, will tell you not to tell the police anything. If he didn't want to
talk, if he hadn't done anything, why does he not want to tell something, you know, because the only thing that can hurt him is admitting
to the crime. But he wanted a lawyer, this great innocent man over
here wanted a lawyer. And he wouldn't sign the form. He wouldn't
even sign the form that he'd been advised of his rights.... He refused
to sign the form. Why wouldn't he at least sign the form that he'd
been advised of his rights? I mean, how can that hurt him? But he
wasn't cooperating. He wasn't doing anything. Guilty people do that,
I submit to you."*
The majority refused to presume prejudice from this commentary on the
defendant's right to remain silent and held that the defendant had not
established a reasonable probability that but for the failure to object to
this argument, the result of the trial would have been different.'" The
majority seemed to concede that if the defendant had been tried after
1991 rather than in 1987, the prejudice would be presumed."o In
1991 the supreme court held as follows:

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 487, 690 S.E.2d at 180.
Id. at 487-88, 690 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 487, 690 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 487-88, 690 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 490-91, 690 S.E.2d at 182-83 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (2009).
See id. at 602, 679 S.E.2d at 721.
Id. at 601, 679 8.E.2d at 720 (alteration in original).
Id. at 602, 679 S.E.2d at 721.
See id.
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[I]n criminal cases, a comment upon a defendant's silence or failure to
come forward is far more prejudicial than probative. Accordingly, from
the date of publication of this opinion[] in the advance sheets of
Georgia Reports, such a comment will not be allowed even where the
defendant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the
stand in his own defense."
The dissenting justices in Patterson argued unsuccessfully that the
commentary on Patterson's silence was so egregious that it violated his
due process rights under the Georgia Constitution, "which uncontrovertedly predates appellant's trial in 1987.n11
In Carter v. State,"s three justices of the supreme court dissented."" In Carter a man shot and killed his brother as the brother was
running away from a house where their father lived."' According to
the dissent, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the
defense of accident that was asserted by trial counsel." The dissent
reasoned that the defense of "accident" is unavailable to persons who
intentionally discharge a gun, even if their intent is merely to scare the
victim."' When that defense was refused by the trial court, trial
counsel did not have a "Plan B."" The dissenting justices concluded
that adequate legal research would have led to the recognition that
accident was not a defense but that the defense of another person-here,
the father-was available." 9 The majority rejected this argument.12 0
Rather, it concluded that trial counsel's failure to seek an instruction on
this defense was harmless because the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to warrant the instruction.121
The supreme court decided one other ineffectiveness case that is
worthy of note. In State v. Nejad," the court of appeals had reversed
a conviction because the defendant's trial counsel did not advise the

111. Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625,630, 409 S.E.2d 839,843 (1991), overruledon other
grounds by Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999).
112. 285 Ga. at 604, 679 S.E.2d at 722 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
113. 285 Ga. 565, 678 S.E.2d 909 (2009).
114. Id. at 567, 678 S.E.2d at 911.
115. Id. at 565, 678 S.E.2d at 910.
116. Id. at 569, 678 S.E.2d at 912 (Hines, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 569-70, 678 S.E.2d at 912-13.
120. Id. at 567, 678 S.E.2d at 911 (majority opinion).
121. Id.
122. 286 Ga. 695, 690 S.E.2d 846 (2010).

228

MERCER LAW REVIEW

defendant of his right to testify."
explained,

IVol. 62

The court of appeals opinion

During the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel unequivoeally stated on several occasions that he told Nejad that he was not
testifying; that he ordered Nejad to inform the court that he was not
going to testify; that he told Nejad that he ruled with an iron fist and
that Nejad would have to do as instructed; that Nejad's family asked
about him testifying to explain the situation with the gun and he told
them that Nejad was not testifying; and that he did not advise Nejad
of his right to make the final decision about testifying at trial. Trial
counsel testified that he was proud of his reputation, but that he
wrongfully made the decision about whether Nejad would testify. Trial
counsel also explicitly recalled that the trial judge did not advise Nejad
of his right to testify.12
The supreme court noted that the trial transcript did "not reflect that
the trial judge [had] informed Nejad of his right to testify," and the trial
judge's notes did not show any indication that he had been so advised. " Nevertheless, the supreme court held that the transcript from
the trial had been, in effect, amended, because after a post-conviction
evidentiary hearing a different trial judge concluded that Nejad had,
after all, been informed by the court of his right to testify."se
B. Georgia Court of Appeals
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided ten cases in which the court
found that criminal defendants had received ineffective assistance of
counsel. In seven cases, the ineffectiveness related to trial counsel's
failure to object to the admissibility of certain kinds of evidence or the
propriety of certain arguments."r In two cases, convictions were set

123. Id. at 695, 690 S.E.2d at 847-48.
124. Nejad v. State, 296 Ga. App. 163, 165,674 S.E.2d 60,62 (2009), rev'd, 286 Ga. 695,
690 S.E.2d 846 (2010).
125. Nqjad, 286 Ga. at 696-97, 690 S.E.2d at 848-49.
126. I& at 698-99, 690 S.E.2d at 850.
127. Cabrera v. State, 303 Ga. App. 646,652, 694 S.E.2d 720, 724 (2010) (trial counsel
did not know that a codefendant's guilty plea was inadmissible if the codefendant refimed
to testify); Wadlington v. State, 302 Ga. App. 559, 559, 561, 692 S.E.2d 28, 29, 31 (2010)
(trial counsel did not know that an officer's testimony that the defendant was the person
depicted on a surveillance tape was inadmissible); Reynolds v. State, 300 Ga. App. 353,
353, 685 S.E.2d 346, 347 (2009) (trial counsel failed to object to an argument about the
defendant's silence); Grindle v. State, 299 Ga. App. 412, 415-16, 683 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2009)
(trial counsel failed to object to detective's hearsay testimony that an accomplice had
identified the defendant as the perpetrator in a custodial statement); Pointer v. State, 299
Ga. App. 249, 250-51, 682 S.E.2d 362, 364 (2009) (trial counsel failed to object when an
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aside because counsel failed to file a meritorious motion to suppress
critical evidence." One case related to the lack of diligence by trial
counsel.12

m.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE
The court of appeals decided three cases during the survey period
related to legal malpractice.'so In Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. v. Attorney 'Itle Services, Inc.," a lawyer who was working
under a contract with a title insurance company allegedly drafted an
incorrect title description, with the result that the insurance company
had to pay a claim to a buyer. The title insurance company sued the
lawyer and a corporation owned by the attorney. The trial court
dismissed the case because the title company did not include an expert
affidavit. The plaintiff argued that the claim was for negligence as a
title examiner rather than as an attorney and that the claim was for
breach of contract." The court of appeals affirmed the trial court,'m
noting that title examination is a legal service provided by a lawyer or
under the lawyer's supervision." As to the breach of contract claim,
the court of appeals noted simply that "[t]he .

.

. [algreement was very

clearly a contract for legal services.""a

expert testified not just that in his opinion, the victim had been sexually abused, but also
that the abuse was perpetrated by the victim's father); Frazier v. State, 298 Ga. App. 487,
490-91, 680 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2009) (trial counsel did not consider objecting to the
defendant's custodial statement on the basis that it was involuntary); Bennett v. State, 298
Ga. App. 464, 466, 680 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2009) (trial counsel did not know that violent acts
of a victim, even those occurring after the alleged crime, were admissible once the
defendant makes a prima facie case of justification).
128. Suluki v. State, 302 Ga. App. 735, 738, 691 S.E.2d 626, 629 (2010) (trial counsel
failed to move to suppress evidence of a gun, the only evidence against the defendant in
a case about possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Thrasher v. State, 300 Ga. App.
154, 157, 684 S.E.2d 318, 321 (2009) (trial counsel failed to move to suppress evidence of
a blood sample that was used to convict the defendant of driving under the influence of
methamphetamines).
129. Gravitt v. State, 301 Ga. App. 131, 133, 687 S.E.2d 150, 152 (2009) (trial counsel
did little or nothing to locate and secure the testimony of two crucial witnesses, both of
whom were readily available).
130. In a fourth case, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a claim for
professional negligence brought by someone who indisputably was never a client of the
lawyer but was instead the adversary of the lawyer's client. Fortson v. Hotard, 299 Ga.
App. 800, 802, 684 S.E.2d 18, 20 (2009).
131. 299 Ga. App. 6, 682 S.E.2d 134 (2009).
132. Id. at 7-9, 682 S.E.2d at 136-37.
133. Id. at 10, 682 S.E.2d at 138.
134. Id. at 8, 682 S.E.2d at 137.
135. Id. at 9, 682 S.E.2d at 137.
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Another case arose from a law firm's failure to timely file an action to
foreclose on a mechanic's lien in the approximate amount of $651,000.
The law firm's client settled its claim for legal malpractice by accepting
an assignment of the firm's right to seek reimbursement of the damages
from the firm's malpractice carrier. The policy, however, contained an
exclusion for any claim arising from actions before the effective date of
the policy if the law firm knew or should have reasonably foreseen that
the act would be the basis of a claim. The trial court granted summary
judgment because the undisputed evidence showed that the firm knew
or should have reasonably foreseen the claim at the time it acquired the
insurance policy." The court of appeals affirmed."'
The third case concerned attorney Stephen M. Katz's representation
of Francine Crowell in a federal suit for wrongful termination in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Katz
did not comply with the district court's case management requirements,
and as a result, the case was dismissed. Katz did not inform his client
of the dismissal, but the client discovered that fact and sued Katz for
malpractice. Katz defaulted, and the only issue at trial was damages.
Crowell obtained a substantial judgment against Katz. The lawyer's
only attempt to escape the judgment was to argue that his former client
had confided that she had been charged with a felony twenty-five years
earlier and had not disclosed that fact to her employer. Employers can
use such after-acquired information to defend against discrimination
claims; therefore, Katz argued that his client would have lost the
underlying case and was not damaged by his malpractice." The trial
court and the court of appeals both rejected this argument."a' Katz did
not come forward with any support for his claim that his former client
had been convicted, and neither did he offer any evidence that her
former employer ever asked about such matters or would have declined
to hire or would have fired her as a result of her conviction. 40 The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment and assessed a $2500 penalty
against Katz for filing a frivolous appeal.14 1

136.
182-84
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

C. Ingram Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 303 Ga. App. 548,548-51,694 S.E.2d 181,
(2010).
Id. at 552, 694 S.E.2d at 185.
Katz v. Crowell, 302 Ga. App. 763, 763-66, 691 S.E.2d 657, 658-59 (2010).
Id. at 766-67, 691 S.E.2d at 659-60.
Id. at 766, 691 S.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 767, 691 S.E.2d at 660.
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IV. BAR ADMISSION
The supreme court issued two opinions during the survey period
related to admission to practice. One applicant graduated from the John
F. Kennedy School of Law, a California law school that is not accredited
by the American Bar Association. Generally, applicants must hold an
initial law degree from an ABA-accredited law school in order to take the
Georgia Bar Examination. The applicant sought a waiver but failed to
make the showing that his education was the equivalent of an education
at an ABA-accredited school. In particular, the applicant failed to
provide analysis and documentation from a dean of an ABA-accredited
law school that the John F. Kennedy School of Law provided an
equivalent legal education."" The Board of Bar Examiners denied his
application for a waiver of the educational requirements, and the
supreme court unanimously affirmed."
Another applicant had obtained her first law degree from a California
"correspondence" law school that used online instruction. Although this
applicant had a master of laws degree from an ABA-accredited school,
she still was required to prove that her first law degree came from an
institution that provided the equivalent of the legal education provided
at an accredited school. The applicant did not provide the dean's letter
as required and instead submitted a letter from the dean of her online
law school and a general, conclusory letter from the associate dean of the
law school where the applicant received her master's degree.'" The
The supreme court
Board of Bar Examiners denied her waiver.'"
unanimously affirmed.'"
V.

JUDicIAL ETHICS

The supreme court issued two opinions related to judicial disqualification during the survey period, and the court of appeals issued one. In
Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. v. Longleaf Energy Associates,
LLC," Justice Nahmias took the unusual step of explaining why he
chose to recuse himself from all cases in which the firm of King &
Spalding represents parties before the supreme court.'" Justice

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

In re Domantay, 285 Ga. 876, 876-77, 684 S.E.2d 628, 629 (2009).
Id. at 876-77, 684 S.E.2d at 629-30.
In re Batterson, 286 Ga. 352, 352-53, 687 S.E.2d 477, 478-79 (2009).
Id. at 352, 687 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 354, 687 S.E.2d at 479.
285 Ga. 859, 684 S.E.2d 632 (2009).
Id. at 859-63, 684 S.E.2d at 632-35.
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Nahmias is married to a King & Spalding equity partner."9 Justice
Nahmias discussed some of the particular circumstances that require
recusal based upon family relationships, such as a circumstance under
which a person too close to the judge is acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding or has more than a de minimis interest in the outcome.so
Ultimately, however, Justice Nahmias relied upon the more general rule
that judges must disqualify themselves whenever the judge's impartialiBecause Justice Nahmias
ty might reasonably be questioned.'
concluded that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned any time
he heard a case in which one of the parties was represented by a law
firm in which his wife is an equity partner, he recused himself from all
such cases."5 2
In Jones County v. A Mining Group, LLC, " the supreme court
granted an application for interlocutory review of an order of recusal.'" A corporation sought permission to build a rock quarry in Jones
County, Georgia, but the Jones County Board of Commissioners (Board)
denied the application. The corporation sued Jones County (County),
and the owners of the land where the quarry would be built intervened
as plaintiffs. All the plaintiffs then filed motions to disqualify all the
judges of the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit because each of the judges
receives a supplement from the County.s Due to the supplement, the
judges would have more than a de minimis interest in the outcome
because the judges would be reluctant to displease the Board.'" A
senior judge granted the motions."' The supreme court reversed.'
Because the County does not legally have discretion regarding whether
to pay the supplement or how much to pay, the supreme court reasoned
that no fair-minded person could reasonably conclude that the judges
Furthermore, the court concluded
would be partial to the County.'
that even if the judges did have an interest in the outcome, the $2700

149. Id. at 859, 684 S.E.2d at 632.
150. Id. at 861, 684 S.E.2d at 633-34; see GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(EX1XcXii)-(iii) (2004), available at http://www.gabar.org/handbook/georgia-code..ofL
judicial-conduct/.
151. LongleafEnergy, 285 Ga. at 862-63, 684 S.E.2d at 635; see GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(EX1).
152. LongleafEnergy, 285 Ga. at 861-63, 684 S.E.2d at 633-35.
153. 285 Ga. 465, 678 S.E.2d 474 (2009).
154. Id. at 465, 678 S.E.2d at 474.
155. Id.
156. See id
157. Id.
158. Id. at 468, 678 S.E.2d at 476.
159. Id. at 467, 678 S.E.2d at 475.
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yearly supplement was de minimis and therefore would not require
recusal.' 60
Morgan v. Propst'6 involved a suit between the administrators of
two estates. The attorney for one of the parties feared that the trial
judge assigned to the case could not be impartial. The attorney had
previously been the district attorney and in that capacity had investigated the trial judge and the judge's husband. The lawyer had also directed
the prosecution of the judge's husband, who was incarcerated as a result.
The trial judge denied the lawyer's motion to recuse on the grounds that
it was untimely and that the accompanying affidavit did not set forth
sufficient facts to warrant recusal. 6 2 The court of appeals vacated the
trial court's order.'" The court held that the motion was timely even
though the action was a renewal action because such proceedings are de
novo, and the motion to recuse was filed within four days of the judge
being assigned to the renewed action.'
The court further held that
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit did state a basis for
recusal.'es The judge's alleged bias against the lawyer stemmed from
an extra-judicial source rather than opinions formed by the judge in the
course of the pending case." ' Based on the source of the bias, there
was sufficient support that the judge could not be fair.167 Therefore,
the court of appeals sent the case back to the trial court, where a
different judge would be assigned to decide the recusal motion."es
VI.

ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION

During the survey period, the supreme court decided one case
involving an attempt to disqualify a law firm. In that case, the
attorneys had a preexisting relationship with Leonard Moody. He was
one of four individuals who were affiliated with a corporation, Cardinal
Robotics. The lawyers agreed to represent the corporation in an action
to quiet title to real estate with the understanding that Moody would
pay the attorney fees and be reimbursed by receiving a quitclaim deed
from Cardinal Robotics for approximately 50% of the property in
question. The lawyers took their instructions from Moody, and the quiet

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 467-68, 678 S.E.2d at 475-76.
301 Ga. App. 402, 688 S.E.2d 357 (2009).
Id. at 402-03, 688 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id. at 405, 688 S.E.2d at 360.
Id. at 404, 688 S.E.2d at 359-60.
Id. at 405, 688 S.E.2d at 360.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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title action was soon dismissed without prejudice. Later, the lawyers
represented Moody and then his executor in an action against Cardinal
Robotics to enforce the agreement to give Moody the quitclaim deed.
Cardinal Robotics sought to disqualify the law firm, and the trial court
The supreme court affirmed because the new
denied the motion."
matter was not substantially related to the matter the firm handled for
its former client, Cardinal Robotics.""0
Obviously, there was some relationship between the two actions
because the second suit was to enforce an agreement regarding the
funding of the first action.'7 1 The matters were not substantially
related for purposes of disqualification, however, because there was no
unfairness to the former client from the lawyers' participation in the
second suit."' Cardinal Robotics was unable to
set forth any specific fact or assert any special knowledge that the ...
attorneys might have gleaned from their brief participation in the prior
action which would have been material to the present suit, or in any
manner, have gained advantage for the plaintiff Moody or worked a
disadvantage to [Cardinal Robotics]. 78
The court of appeals also decided one disqualification case during the
survey period. In that case, a lawyer represented a client against Life
Care Centers of America. In the settlement of that action, Life Care and
the attorney agreed that the attorney would maintain the confidentiality
of all information he obtained in discovery for three years.'7 The
agreement also contained a provision that stated that the lawyer's "firm
75
was 'deemed hired and retained as counsel on behalf of [Life Care]."
The agreement also apparently provided that if requested, the lawyer
would agree to be retained by the firm of Baker Donelson to provide
advice to Life Care. The lawyer submitted an affidavit in which he
stated that he was never asked to do so and in fact never provided
professional services to Baker Donelson or to Life Care. When the
lawyer filed a new action for a different client against Life Care, Life
Care filed a motion to disqualify the lawyer. 76
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to disqualify
the firm because Life Care made only "conclusory allegations" and had

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Cardinal Robotics, Inc. v. Moody, 287 Ga. 18, 18-20,694 S.E.2d 346,347-48 (2010).
Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 350.
See id. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 21-22, 694 S.E.2d at 349-50.
Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 350.
Life Care Centers v. Smith, 298 Ga. App. 739, 744, 681 S.E.2d 182, 187 (2009).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 744-45, 681 S.E.2d at 187.
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not shown that the lawyer had violated the settlement agreement in the
earlier case.'
Nevertheless, the court could have done more. Georgia
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6(b)" provides that a "lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making... an agreement in which a restriction
on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy
between private parties."n That is exactly what the agreement in the
settlement of the earlier case would have done. If the agreement "to
maintain the confidentiality of all the information produced during
discovery"" meant the lawyer could not use the discovery information
in the earlier case on behalf of another client, the agreement would in
effect be an agreement not to sue Life Care and would thus be prohibited.'
Furthermore, the agreement to employ the lawyer in the future
is another roundabout way of agreeing that the lawyer will not sue Life
Care.182 The effect of that agreement is to create a conflict of interest
that would restrict the lawyer's right to practice-his right to sue Life
This settlement
Care-as part of the settlement of the first claim."
agreement could well have been declared invalid as a matter of public
policy because it violated the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.'"
VII.

ONE LESSON IN PROFESSIONALISM

In Ellis v. Ellis," the supreme court dealt with a fundamental issue
of lawyer professionalism. In Ellis a husband filed for divorce. The wife
was represented by counsel, Law, but he did not file a responsive
pleading. Instead, Law secured the informal agreement of the husband's
lawyer, Turner, to give notice before any final hearing, and the two

177. Id. at 745, 681 S.E.2d at 187.
178. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2001).
179. Id.
180. Smith, 298 Ga. App. at 744, 681 S.E.2d at 187.
181. See ABA Formal Ethics Op. 00-417 (2000).
As a practical matter, however, this proposed limitation effectively would bar the
lawyer from future representations because the lawyer's inability to use certain
information may materially limit his representation of the future client and,
further, may adversely affect that representation. Once the lawyer reaches these
conclusions, client consent is ineffective. Rule 1.7(b) would prohibit the representation. Thus, a prohibition against using the information is a restriction upon the
lawyees right to practice.
Id. (footnote omitted).
182. See Smith, 298 Ga. App. at 744, 681 S.E.2d at 187.
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 266 Ga. 61, 61-63, 463 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (1995) (contract
that gave attorney right to accept settlement without consulting client violated the
applicable rules of conduct and was unenforceable as a matter of public policy).
185. 286 Ga. 625, 690 S.E.2d 155 (2010).
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lawyers exchanged correspondence about mediation and discovery. The
husband then hired a new lawyer, Sheppard, who promptly secured a
judgment on the pleadings without a hearing and without notice to the
wife's lawyer. Because the wife's counsel did not file a responsive
pleading, no rule or statute required Sheppard to give notice of her
application for judgment on the pleadings.1 s
A preliminary issue is whether what Sheppard did was unprofessional.
In Georgia, professionalism requires that lawyers treat opposing counsel
with "fairness, integrity, and civility."." Part of civility in the context
of lawyer-to-lawyer professionalism is to live up to all agreements with
opposing counsel, regardless of whether they are in writing."
It
would have been unprofessional, therefore, for Turner to take the case
to a final hearing without telling Law, the wife's lawyer. Of course,
there was no final "hearing;" instead, there was an ex parte judgment on
the pleadings."
Yet that must be a distinction without a difference:
the clear import of the agreement between Law and Turner was that
Turner would not seek a final resolution of the case without informing
his adversary.xo Of course, Sheppard did not make the agreement
with the wife's counsel.191 Yet if she knew about it (a fact that she
denied), then surely it would be unfair to Law and therefore unprofessional to take the case to judgment without notifying Law aither that
she was doing so or that she did not consider herself bound by her
predecessor's agreement. Even if Sheppard did not know about the
agreement, the papers in the file revealed that Law and Turner had
corresponded about discovery and mediation. 92 Those documents
should have put Sheppard on notice that the wife's lawyer was not
ignoring the case and expected to be involved-and presumably
notified-as the case proceeded. Again, if Sheppard wanted to handle
the case "by the book," that would be her right, but fairness required
that she notify Law of her intention to do so. If this analysis is correct,
then under any interpretation of the facts, Sheppard acted unprofessionally in obtaining the judgment without notice.

186. Id. at 625-26, 690 S.E.2d at 156-57.
187. A LAWYER'S CREED, supra note 91.
188. See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
CIRcUIT, at 12 (one proposed standard for conduct in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit states that lawyers shall "adhere to all express promises and to
agreements with other counsel, whether oral or in writing"), available at http//www.
ca7.uscourts.gov/civility.pdf.
189. See Ellis, 286 Ga. at 625, 690 S.E.2d at 156.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 625-26, 690 S.E.2d at 156.
192. See id. at 625, 690 S.E.2d at 156.
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The harder question is whether the courts should do anything about
it. Determining how to enforce professionalism is a much more difficult
problem than defining it.'" The Georgia Lawyer's Creed, which
describes the professionalism obligations of Georgia lawyers, states that
the creed "cannot be imposed by edict because moral integrity and
unselfish dedication to the welfare of others cannot be legislated.""
Courts and scholars have expressed differing views about the wisdom of
judicial enforcement of professionalism." Ellis presents perhaps the
most difficult kind of case: the lawyer did not violate any rule or statute
and served her client well, even if some would call her means unprofessional. How should the courts rule in such cases?
One would have thought this question was answered in Georgia by
Green v. Greenl" a case in which a wife filed for divorce but then
moved from the state. After she moved, her lawyer withdrew. When the
case reached the court's trial calendar, the husband's lawyer took
aggressive steps to obtain judgment without notifying the wife, even
though the husband's counsel knew where the wife was.19 Although
there was no statute or rule that required the husband's counsel to
notify the wife, the supreme court held,
[Tihe courts will not condone a refusal "to act out of a spirit of cooperation and civility and not wholly out of a sense of blind and unbridled
advocacy." That spirit of cooperation and civility, when taken together
with the notions of fundamental fairness that lie at the heart of the
principle of due process of law, requires that attorneys, as officers of
the court, make a good faith effort to ensure that all parties to a
controversy have a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Such an
effort may entail, as is already the customary practice of many
attorneys, counsel assuming the burden of notifying by mail any

193. See Patrick E. Longan, TeachingProfessionalism,Articles Edition, 60 MERCER L.
REv. 659, 679-87 (2009).
194. A LAWYER'S CREED, supra note 91.

195. See, e.g., Dondi Prop. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 288
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (asserting that lawyers who act unprofessionally should expect a range
of sanctions from "a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in
open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate
to the circumstances." But see Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter'sCommentary on the Profession-

alism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 325 (1995) ("[Judges] should be careful, however, in
their efforts to police both frivolous litigation and incivility, given the intrinsic limitations
we have identified in the use of both bright-line legal rules and broad equitable discretion
in addressing those problems. They should, in particular, be wary of using highly coercive
penalties in view of the dangers of chilling vigorous advocacy and the difficulties of
distinguishing conscientious activism from ill-motivated aggression.").
196. 263 Ga. 551, 437 S.E.2d 457 (1993).
197. Id. at 551-53, 437 S.E.2d at 457-59.
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unrepresented opposing party when their case appears on a trial
calendar. No such effort was made in this case.'e
Justice Sears-Collins concurred in the result but cautioned against using
notions of professionalism rather than statutes and rules to decide
She described the case as beginning "the descent of the
cases.'
slippery slope of legislating civility and courtesy" and urged that the
supreme court "should not permit its distaste for lawyers who may not
be exercising common sense, maturity, and civility to blind it to the
problems of legislating such conduct. 2 " Thus, it would seem after the
decision in Green that Georgia courts will at least sometimes rectify the
consequences of unprofessional conduct that violates no rule or statute.
However, the supreme court's decision in Ellis may signal a departure
from that approach. In Ellis the court affirmed the judgment because
the wife, through counsel, waived notice by failing to file a responsive
pleading.20 1 The majority did not address the question of Sheppard's
professionalism but instead simply noted that the applicable procedures
entitled her to proceed without notice. 2 In other words, it appears to
be permissible to litigate "by the book" without fear that the courts will
take action to discourage conduct that is legal but nevertheless
unprofessional. Three justices dissented, in part because "the manner
of resolution of this case violated basic notions of fairness and professionalism.n20 It will bear watching to see whether the courts in Georgia
adopt the approach to the enforcement of professionalism evidenced in
Green or that which appears in Ellis.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
The appellate courts in Georgia decided three miscellaneous cases
regarding the professional responsibilities of lawyers during the survey
period. In Gonnella v. State,' the supreme court reversed the trial
court's denial of a motion for new trial because of prosecutorial
The main witness against the defendant was an
misconduct.2 0
accomplice who pled guilty under an agreement that allowed him to seek
a lighter sentence after he testified. The prosecution did not produce to

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 554-55, 437 S.E.2d at 459-60 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 556, 437 S.E.2d at 461 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
Id. at 558, 437 S.E.2d at 462.
Ellis, 286 Ga. at 626, 690 S.E.2d at 156-57.
See id. at 626, 690 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 633, 690 S.E.2d at 161 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
286 Ga. 211, 686 S.E.2d 644 (2009).
Id at 215-16, 686 S.E.2d at 647-48.

20101

LEGAL ETHICS

239

the defense the document that would have shown this part of the deal
and enabled the defense to impeach the witness on that basis.2 0
The case of Cabiness v. Lambro207 dealt with a judgment of criminal
contempt against an attorney. The trial court placed the assets of
several people and entities under receivership and issued an injunction
to prohibit all persons from creating liens on the receivership property.
Nevertheless, the lawyer's client filed a notice of lien against the
property. After the lawyer forwarded the notice to the receiver, the trial
court found the lawyer in criminal contempt for violating the injunction.208 The court of appeals reversed because the client, rather than
the lawyer, violated the injunction by filing the notice of lien.2 0 The
act of forwarding the notice to the receiver did not violate the injunction;
nor could the attorney be held in contempt for failing to dismiss the
notice of lien.2 " The lawyer had no authority to dismiss the notice
without instructions from his client.
Finally, the court of appeals decided a case involving an attorney's
apparent authority to enter into a settlement on behalf of a client.2 12
A husband and wife sued Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company,
among other defendants. The couple's lawyer negotiated a settlement
with counsel for Liberty Mutual, and the uncontroverted evidence was
that Liberty Mutual's counsel was never informed of any limitation on
the authority of the couple's lawyer to settle the case. The trial court
enforced a settlement agreement reached by the couple's attorney with
the lawyer for Liberty Mutual despite the couple's contention that the
attorney did not have authority to enter into that settlement.1 a The
court of appeals affirmed.2 14 Because the limitation, if there was one,
was not communicated to Liberty Mutual, Liberty Mutual was entitled
to rely on the plenary apparent authority of the lawyer to settle the case
on behalf of the client.21 s

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 213-14, 686 S.E.2d at 646-47.
303 Ga. App. 253, 692 S.E.2d 817 (2010).
Id. at 253-55, 692 S.E.2d at 818-19.
Id. at 255-56, 692 S.E.2d at 819.
Id.
Id.
Stephens v. Alan V. Mock Constr. Co., 302 Ga. App. 280, 690 S.E.2d 225 (2010).
Id. at 280-82, 690 S.E.2d at 227-29.
Id. at 281, 690 S.E.2d at 227.
Id. at 284-85, 690 S.E.2d at 230.
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IX. OPINIONS OF THE FORmAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD2 16
During the survey period, the State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory
Opinion Board (Board) took actions with respect to four items that are
worthy of note. First, the Board voted to withdraw an opinion that
addressed this question: "Is it permissible for an attorney to compensate
a lay public relations or marketing organization to promote the services
of an attorney through the advertising means listed in Rule 7.2 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct?"'17 The Board had issued and
twice published a proposed opinion, but the Board voted to withdraw the
opinion and not submit it to the supreme court for review.218
Second, the Board dealt with an opinion addressing these questions:
"Is a lawyer obligated to notify a client's creditors or third persons when
the lawyer receives the proceeds of a client's settlement or judgment? If
the lawyer is obligated to notify a third person, is the lawyer then
obligated to pay that third person, even over the client's objections? 219
The answers to these questions require an interpretation of Georgia Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.15(I).220 Although the Board had approved
a proposed opinion, during the survey year the Board tabled the opinion
because the State Disciplinary Rules and Procedure Committee is
considering a proposed amendment to Rule 1.15(I).221
Third, the Board approved proposed opinion 08-R5, "Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee
Contract to Provide Legal Services. 22 The proposed opinion appeared
in the Georgia Bar Journal's April 2010 issue." That draft opinion
discusses the ethical issues that arise in three circumstances:
1. A Sophisticated User of Legal Services Offers to Retain a Lawyer or
Law Firm to Provide It With an Indeterminate Amount of Legal
Services of a Particular Type for an Agreed Upon Fixed Fee ....
2. A Third-Party Offers to Retain a Lawyer or Law Firm to Handle an
Indeterminate Amount of Legal Work of a Particular Type for a Fixed

216. The Author is a member of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (Board). In this
Article, the Author speaks only for himself and not for the Board or its other members.
217. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ANNUAL REPORT FOR

OPERATIONAL YEAR 2009-2010, at 17 (2010), availableat http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf

/OGC/OGC Report_09_10.pdf.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 14.
220. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(I) (2001).
221. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 217, at 14.
222. Id. at 15.

223. FirstPublicationofProposed FormalAdvisory OpinionNo. 08-R5, 15 GA. B.J. 82
(Apr. 2010).
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Fee for Those the Third-Party Payor is Contractually Obligated to
Defend and Indemnity Who Win Be the Clients of the Lawyer or Law
Firm ....
3. A Third-Party Offers to Retain a Lawyer or Law Firm to Provide an
Indeterminate Amount of Legal Work for an Indeterminate Number of
Clients Where the Third-Party Paying for the Legal Service Has an
Obligation to Furnish the Assistance of Counsel to Those Who Will Be
Clients of the Lawyer But Does Not Have a Direct Stake in the
Outcome of Any Representation.'
The publication of the proposed opinion began a period in which
interested parties could submit comments."
Finally, the Board continued to deal with an important issue related
to conflicts of interest and public defenders. Proposed opinion 07-Ri
addresses the following question: "May different public defenders
employed by the same agency represent co-defendants when a single
public defender would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing
so?""m The Board initially approved and in October 2008 published an
opinion with the following summary conclusion:
Different public defenders employed by the same agency are not
automatically disqualified from representing co-defendants when a
single public defender would have an impermissible conflict of interest
merely because of such employment. Public defenders working in
different offices and employing effective safeguards to protect each
client's confidential information and trial strategy may represent such
co-defendants unless other circumstances create a conflict of interest
for one or more of the public defenders.'
After the Board received comments on that draft opinion, the Board
revised it and issued the published version with a different conclusion.' The new summary answer was as follows: "Lawyers employed
in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not
represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so."'
The Board approved a second
publication of the opinion for June 2010 (with the opinion now denoted
as "Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1") with one sentence added to the end

224. Id. at 82-83, 85.
225. See GA. RuLEs oF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 4-403(c) (2001).
226. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 217, at 15.
227. FirstPublicationofProposed FormalAdvisory Opinion No. 07-R1, 14 GA. B.J. 82,
82 (Oct. 2008).
228. See First Publicationof Amended Proposed FormalAdvisory Opinion No. 07-R1,
15 GA. B.J. 72 (Feb. 2010).
229. Id. at 72.
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of the opinion: "Conversely, lawyers employed in circuit public defender
offices in different judicial circuits are not considered members of the
same 'unit' or 'firm' within the meaning of Rule 1.10."m
X.

CONCLUSION

These decisions from the appellate courts of Georgia and from the
Formal Advisory Opinion Board provide important guidance for Georgia
lawyers as they seek to discharge their professional responsibilities. As
the Georgia law of lawyering continues to develop, it will behoove
Georgia lawyers to pay close attention to these developments.

230. Second Publicationof FormalAdvisory OpinionNo. 07-R1 Hereinafterknown as
'FormalAdvisory Opinion No. 10-1,' 15 GA. B.J. 92, 94 (June 2010).

